Edith Cowan University

Research Online
ECU Publications Pre. 2011
2006

A review of landholder motivations and determinants for
participation in conservation covenanting programmes
Thomas Kabii
Edith Cowan University

Pierre Horwitz
Edith Cowan University

Follow this and additional works at: https://ro.ecu.edu.au/ecuworks
Part of the Life Sciences Commons
10.1017/S0376892906002761
This is an Author's Accepted Manuscript of: Kabii, T. I., & Horwitz, P. (2006). A review of landholder motivations and
determinants for participation in conservation covenanting programmes. Environmental Conservation, 33(1), 11-20.
Available here.
This version is free to view and download for private research and study only. Not for re-distribution, re-sale or use
in derivative works. © Environmental Conservation.
This Journal Article is posted at Research Online.
https://ro.ecu.edu.au/ecuworks/2178

Environmental Conservation 33 (1): 11–20 © 2006 Foundation for Environmental Conservation

doi:10.1017/S0376892906002761

A review of landholder motivations and determinants for participation in
conservation covenanting programmes
THOMAS KABII† AND PIERRE HORWITZ∗
Consortium for Health and Ecology, School of Natural Sciences, Edith Cowan University, Joondalup, WA 6027, Australia

Date submitted: 20 May 2005 Date accepted: 22 February 2006
SUMMARY
Conservation covenants (or easements) are flexible
but legally enforceable documents attached to a land
title restricting the use of that land, providing for
the protection of important conservation values, while
allowing the landholder to retain possession. Given the
attractiveness of covenants to those who seek to expand
national and regional nature conservation initiatives, it
is important to understand landholder motivations for
participation in programmes that covenant for nature
conservation. This paper examines the likely influences
on landholder decision making when it comes to conservation initiatives. A review of literature highlights
key motivations and determinants, such as landholder
demographics and the nature of the land tenure in question, their knowledge and awareness of the programme,
financial circumstances, and perceptions of financial
and other risks and benefits of the programme itself,
including incentives and compensation. Underpinning,
or mediating, the decision-making processes will be
landholder philosophies and values, and five constructs
are determined from the review, namely economic
dependence on property, private property rights, confidence in perpetual covenant mechanisms, nature conservation equity and nature conservation ethic. Using
these constructs, a series of explicit hypotheses is
drawn, applicable to agencies dealing with conservation covenants and testable through an adaptive
management approach. A conceptual model is
presented to show hypothesized relationships between
motivational factors and the five constructs that
will lead to the uptake of covenants by landholders,
providing direction for policy makers and managers
of incentive programmes for nature conservation on
private lands.
Keywords: covenants, easements, equity, nature conservation,
private land, property rights
INTRODUCTION
Government or private agencies will not buy and maintain
every area of land and/or water on private property that merits
conservation. Disenchantment with overcommitted public
∗
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land-management and resource agencies and insensitivities
of centralized regulatory authorities to local communities
(Stephens 2001; Merenlender et al. 2004), have led
to the emergence and rapid evolution of incentivebased voluntary conservation mechanisms for private-land
resources. Conservation covenants in perpetuity (referred to
as ‘perpetual covenants’; ‘easements’ in the USA) are one such
class of mechanisms.
Perpetual covenants are flexible but legally enforceable
documents attached to the land title and tailored to
individual properties, the needs of individual landholders and
institutional requirements. They are voluntarily donated or
sold by a landholder to a unit of government or a recognized
non-profit conservation organization as a non-possessory
interest of a holder in real property (Wright 1993). They
restrict the use of the land by specifying the obligation and
entitlements under which the land is to be managed (Jordan
1993; Binning & Young 1997). Perpetual covenants entail a
long-term commitment on the part of the landholder and the
private or public conservation agency to the protection of
important values of the land while allowing the landholder
to retain possession and controlled use of the land (Jordan
1993; Wright 1993). They are frequently included as part
of a contractual package in formal (government-sponsored)
voluntary incentive programmes for nature conservation on
privately-owned land (Langholz & Lassoie 2001).
Given their attractiveness to those who seek to expand
national and regional nature conservation initiatives (Stephens
2001), it is important to understand landholder motivations
for participation in such programmes (Merenlender et al.
2004). This would place more emphasis than has otherwise
been the case on farmer concerns, so that farmers’ opinions
can be considered more carefully in agricultural research
and extension, particularly in relation to environmental
management and sustainable agriculture (Vanclay & Lawrence
1994).
However, limited empirical research on the motivational
and other influences on the uptake of restrictive agreements
for nature conservation is available. In its absence, this review
draws upon research, using a selection of literature from
Australia, the USA and elsewhere, that examines influences
on the uptake of land and soil conservation initiatives,
agricultural technologies and schemes that set out to retain
native vegetation on private land.
These initiatives and schemes are hypothesized to be
directly relevant to motivational factors for covenanting, and
the extensive literature on their uptake (adoption) confirms the
function of a complex set of factors (Clearfield & Osgood 1986;
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Vanclay & Lawrence 1995). In general, landholders respond
positively to nature conservation efforts as long as proposed
conservation measures are not perceived as a threat to their
livelihood in terms of social and economic welfare, long-term
objectives for the land and possibly long-term tenure with
a notion of retaining land in the family. Measures that are
viewed to be economically unfavourable, alienating the land
from its owner or decreasing its market value, might not
be readily accepted. Vanclay and Lawrence (1994) identified
eleven ‘barriers to adoption’ of commercial and environmental
innovations, most of which can be hypothesized to have
relevance to decisions on the uptake of perpetual covenants,
including: the complexity of the management practice;
incompatibility with farm and personal objectives; loss of
flexibility through tight restrictions; implementation cost;
uncertainty about benefits from the investment; conflicting
information about benefits or consequences of adoption;
negative perceptions of the environment; the absence of
infrastructure that can support the implementation of the
required actions; and the social infrastructure, meaning
the influence of other farmers on individual farmer’s
decisions.
If landholders perceive that encumbrances on the land
title and other restrictions on use of the land under
conservation are not in their interest, they can be reluctant
to take up nature conservation schemes (James 1997;
Productivity Commission 2001). Conversely, farmers are
motivated towards environmental protection and participation
in the various environmental programmes when they have
a stake in the outcomes of conservation (Klapproth &
Johnson 2001). Government policies also have an important
role to play in influencing farmers’ receptivity to land
conservation programmes (Hollick 1990), by legitimizing
such programmes, or by authorizing the implementation of
incentives and removing disincentives.
This paper examines behaviour of farmers and other
landholders participating in environmentally-related land
management practices. Since attitudes are likely to be better
predictors of behaviour to which they are specifically related
(Ajzen & Fishbein 1980; Vogel 1996), successful uptake of
conservation practices is likely to be influenced more by
farmers’ attitudes and perceptions than by any other factor
(Miranowski & Shortle 1986; Smathers 1982).
The frameworks landholders use to decide whether or not
to participate in a covenanting programme will depend upon
several determinant (independent) variables: (1) landholder
demographics and the nature of the land tenure in question,
(2) landholder knowledge and awareness of the programme,
(3) financial circumstances of landholder, and (4) landholder
perceptions of financial and other risks and benefits of the
programme itself.
Underpinning many of these variables will be landholder
philosophies and values, such as: (1) their appreciations of,
and attitudes to, notions of equity, (2) their appreciations
of, and attitudes to, notions of property rights, and (3) their
conservation ethic.

This paper discusses these three classes of factors and
their inter-relationships, and aims to produce a conceptual
model that suggests intervention points for policy makers and
delivers testable hypotheses for future research.

DETERMINANTS OF COVENANT UPTAKE BY
LANDHOLDERS
Age, duration of land tenure and full-time or
part-time farming
Landholder age has been found to be a factor determining
uptake of low-input practices on farmlands. Older landholders
have been characterized as being more resistant to uptake
because they perceived covenants to be unfeasible or
impractical, and were more sceptical about the benefits of
uptake, since those benefits would not occur during their
lifetime (Drost et al. 1996). Similarly, landholders with a long
period of land ownership in the family are more likely to resist
uptake of a perpetual covenant than landholders with a shorter
period of family land ownership, because of their confidence
in their ability and accumulated experience to deal with the
conservation threats on the land without the use of a binding
covenant mechanism.
Alternatively, older landholders, and those with a long
period of land ownership in the family, may more readily
adopt practices to protect land values like covenants if there
are no heirs or if they perceive the next generation to
be untrustworthy. Under these circumstances, we would
expect positive correlations between the decision of primary
producers to undertake environmental stewardship and their
duration of tenure (see Haw et al. 2000).
Landholders’ willingness to participate in conservation
programmes can be characterized according to whether they
were farming full-time or part-time and the size of their
properties. Klapproth and Johnson’s (2001) review of a
study of Maryland’s riparian landowners comparing the
characteristics of those who had established forested riparian
buffers through an incentive programme and those who
had not, showed that part-time farmers were more likely
to participate in programmes than full-time farmers because
(1) their opportunity cost of taking land out of production
was much lower than more active farmers, (2) they were
less concerned about possible hidden costs of adopting the
programme, and (3) they were more likely to be interested in
on-site amenities generated by the conserved areas than fulltime farmers (Hagan 1996, cited in Klapproth and Johnson
2001).
Knowledge and awareness of the programme, and its
relevance to landholder goals
Landholders have unique ways of managing their properties
and this can impede innovations or uptake of conservation
technologies (Drost et al. 1996). They are also more likely to
accept innovations or practices that they view to be profitable,
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simple to implement and compatible with their goals and
objectives for the land (Klapproth & Johnson 2001). Simply
stated, landholders will only take up a conservation innovation
when they understand it well, have confidence in it over other
mechanisms, view it to be easy to implement and in accord
with their goals and objectives for the land, and their reasoning
is not unduly impeded by financial considerations.
Drawing upon further studies of issues surrounding
the adoption of riparian forest buffers on private lands,
Klapproth and Johnson (2001) differentiated between those
landholders that possessed and those that lacked an interest
in a conservation reserve programme. Those interested in
the programme were primarily motivated by appreciation of
nature, environmental conservation and economic arguments,
while those that did not want to participate were more
concerned with any potential economic loss they might incur
from uptake of the programme, or wished to avoid the
programme’s rules and regulations.
The principal factors that influence the uptake of
conservation innovations by landholders vary with the type
of innovation. Guerin (1999), for example, pointed out that
uptake of soil conservation practice is attributed to the
intrinsic characteristics of the practice itself: its mode of
operation as well as the principles on which it operates. The
ease of application or uptake and versatility of conservation
innovations or practices are important elements that influence
their uptake (Drost et al. 1996). Inadequate knowledge
about a prescribed innovation, particularly with respect to
its benefits and the issues that it aims to address, can
limit its uptake (Guerin 1999). Individuals must agree that
the goals of the programme are worth pursuing and that
their actions will advance the goal, non-compliance must be
observable in order to create social pressure for compliance
and the cost of the programme should not greatly exceed
benefits derived by landholders (Harrington et al. 1985).
In this sense, conservation practices that are little known
are not likely to be easily adopted, giving policy makers
clear direction to instigate promotional activities. In Ohio
(USA), for example, availability of information that leads
to increased awareness and knowledge was one of the most
popularly cited requirements by farmers for successful uptake
of a conservation practice (Batte et al. 1990). Langholz
et al. (2000a), in their study of landowners participating
and not participating in Costa Rica’s Private Wildlife Refuge
Programme, found a substantial information gap existed,
which if breached would lead to easy and quick uptake.
However, uptake of a conservation innovation may not
occur even when all is known about it. The relevance of
an innovation in terms of its consistency with landholder
needs and goals, socioeconomic status and attitudes towards
different practices remain crucial to its uptake (Nowak 1987).
Economic factors and landholder finances
Buttel et al. (1990) present an overview of the changing
research foci and theoretical approaches within rural
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sociological research over the last century. Evidence suggests
that the uptake of innovative environmental practices occurs
for commercial reasons rather than environmental benefits,
especially among commercially-oriented farmers as opposed
to those ‘farming as a way of life’. In terms of conservation
easements, Parker (2004, p. 498) adds that their adoption will
‘. . . probably facilitate more economical production of nonconservation output.’ The suggestion inherently categorizes
farmers into two groups based on whether the source of their
motivation in decision-making regarding the uptake of an
innovation is economic or not.
Economists argue that individuals make rational decisions
in choosing options that seem to them most likely to secure
their largest net, or even most immediate, economic advantage.
Most rural landholders live in an economic environment
where they gain land or off-farm employment or economic
benefits. Therefore any major decisions regarding their land
might rightly be influenced by their economic implications
(Vanclay & Lawrence 1995). This view is consistent with
Dunlap and Van Liere’s (1984) conclusion that concerns for
the environment are a significant motivation for appropriate
environmental behaviour only when basic economic and
survival needs are met. Langholz et al. (2000b) concluded from
their study of profitability as a motivation for nature reserve
establishment and operation that profit was an extremely
powerful motivating force for landowners, second only to a
sense of stewardship or conservation ethic.
Farmers’ choices might therefore be seen as being
constrained within some multidimensional ‘decision space’
boundaries within which they operate, and a farmer’s
objectives and perceptions of his/her economic situation are
decision determinants held within these boundaries (Hollick
1990).
Compensation decisions with respect to three case studies
in Queensland (Australia) suggest that biodiversity may be
threatened where there is a perception of an economic
imbalance between the benefits associated with conservation
effort and those from alternative land-uses (Tisdell & Harrison
1999). This suggestion is compounded where an economic
loss from the uptake of a conservation programme is a
possible risk. Some landholders are unwilling to incur costs
in programmes that offer only long-term economic returns
(Norris & Shabman 1988). The level of farm debt is another
situational barrier that is likely to significantly influence
the decisions of landholders to undertake conservation
measures that require or trade-off financial input (Haw
et al. 2000). The relative productivity of the land (measured
in financial terms) also influences uptake of conservation
practices or innovation (Sinden & King 1990), and a metaanalysis of 34 datasets carried out by Gartell and Gartell
(1985) showed uptake was positively correlated with farm
income. These issues suggest that institutions involved in
landholder finances like banks (farm debt), governments
(taxation, rates) and cooperatives (product pricing) can play
a role in overcoming barriers (see discussion on incentives
below).
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Perceived risks and benefits
Uptake of a conservation innovation is more likely to meet
with resistance where the perceived benefits and risks are
not clear (Hollick 1990; Guerin 1999). Alternatively, farmers
will adopt conservation technologies when they perceive land
degradation to be an active hazard to their productivity
or infrastructure (Rickson et al. 1987). Minimizing such
financial risk is particularly important for encouraging uptake
of sustainable farming practices (Drost et al. 1996) because, as
Conacher (1998) noted, change in environmental behaviour
becomes an issue if people feel ‘threatened’. Therefore,
landholder decisions regarding the uptake of a perpetual
covenant can be influenced by their perception of risks and
benefits to their short- and long-term farm objectives, often
measurable in financial terms.
If farmers are more concerned with using the land to
support themselves rather than maintaining the ecosystem
(Alexander 1995), they will want to realise the direct and
tangible benefits of the mechanism or programme in most
instances (Norris & Shabman 1988). Local communities
often appropriate little economic benefit from conservation
programmes, which may be a disincentive to biodiversity
conservation (Tisdell 1998). For example, Klapproth &
Johnson (2001) demonstrated that landholders were willing
to adopt a conservation programme if the proposed actions
under the programme had direct benefits such as a permit to
extract material, grazing rights and direct financial incentives.
Other incentives might include tax-relief (Wright 1993). In
the USA, the tax benefits to the landholder generated by the
conservation covenant are determined by subtracting the value
of the land after the covenant from the value of the land before
the covenant was granted (Gustanski 2000; Parker 2004). This
allows landholders to write-off the value of the development
rights as a charitable donation, provided that appraisals of the
value of the land are not inflated or otherwise unrealistic (see
Anderson & Christensen 2005). The benefits of a programme
or mechanism must therefore be clearly established, with
regulatory oversight.
The span of time before benefits can be realised can also
influence the uptake of a conservation innovation. Norris and
Shabman (1988) suggested that even when economic reasons
were the motivation for programme uptake, farmers were
unwilling to incur costs in proposed programme activities or
investments that offered only long-term economic returns.
In addition, Langholz et al. (2000a) demonstrated that
unintended incentives (beyond those offered formally as
incentives to enter a conservation programme) proved to be
key selling points for landowners in Costa Rica.
Risks and benefits are not always measured in exclusively
financial terms, particularly where a close personal
identification with, or attachment to, a place of environmental
significance exists (particularly where such a place may
connote a significant past event or experience; Rogan
et al. 2005). Likely benefits to landholders through the use
of perpetual covenants include an explicit recognition that
existing recognized values of the property will continue to

be protected by their heirs (see Wright 1993), and this may
be a strong motivating factor for landholders to participate
in negotiations to prepare the necessary legal documentation.
Depending on the jurisdiction, however, perpetual covenants
can be modified or terminated with the agreement of both
covenantee and covenantor or by a court of law, particularly
when the conservation objectives of the covenant become
impossible to achieve. This ability to challenge a perpetual
covenant in a court of law, or to change it in the future, may
cause them to be viewed by conservation-minded landholders
as unreliable for assuring long-term nature conservation,
and this may provide a reason for their reluctance to
participate in a covenanting programme. Alternatively, it
may suit landholders who are wary of the finality of legal
documentation.
Risks such as potentially undesirable impacts of uptake of
conservation practices can influence decisions. In the USA,
for example, landholders expressed a fear that the retention
of conservation areas under a programme would lead to
undesirable consequences, such as the introduction of pests
like deer and noxious weeds onto the farmland (Klapproth
& Johnson 2001). Similar sentiments were expressed in
Australia, with regard to the perceived spread of weedy
plants and feral animals from programmes that sought
to make connections between tracts of native vegetation
on farmlands (Coates 1987; Jenkins 1998). In these cases,
landholders may perceive risks where agricultural production
is threatened, thereby impacting on farm incomes, or where
threats to existing ecological or other non-economic values are
conceivable.

LANDHOLDER PHILOSOPHIES AND VALUES
Equity
The major tenet of the equity theory, as part of the theory of
motivation, is that human beings work to restore equity when
they are confronted with inequitable situations (Harrington
et al. 1985). Article 19.2 of the Convention on Biological
Diversity assumes that there are benefits that flow from the use
of biodiversity and that these ought to be shared between the
custodians of biodiversity and the public (Glowka et al. 1994).
Similarly, there is a view among a cross-section of landholders
that the cost of nature conservation on private land should be
shared equitably between landholders and the public, and
that recognition should be made of the services provided
by landholders to the broader community (see for example
Australian and New Zealand Environment and Conservation
Council 1997).
Common (1996) and Jodha and Russell (1997) observed that
conservation initiatives may cause a disproportionate spread
of costs and benefits over space and time, thus creating or
accentuating perceived or real social and economic inequalities
for different landholders in different ways. Concern has been
noted by farmers in the USA that they might be forced
to bear the cost or incur losses from conservation actions
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that primarily benefit the public (Klapproth & Johnson
2001). Local communities have few incentives to conserve
biodiversity if they perceive they do not equitably share
its benefits (Tisdell 1998). Therefore, despite the increased
recognition of the importance of encouraging conservation
of nature on private land by governments and the public
(Harrington et al. 1985), the issues as to who should pay,
how individual needs and circumstances can be addressed
and how goals and standards should be set to ensure flexibility
and fairness to all, are rarely addressed.
In a detailed analysis of the principles, motivations, conflicts
and constructions of justice, Montada (2003) identified
the components of equity (in relation to equity theory of
distributive justice) as the proportionality (and equality of
ratios) of contributions and outcomes for similar actors. This
theory may be particularly relevant in the apportionment of
financial and other economic incentives among landholders
for encouraging their participation in nature conservation
activities. Intergenerational equity, viewed by Common
(1996) in terms of the distribution of utility over time, in
which a consumption foregone today makes available units of
consumption at a future date, can fit the above definitions if
consumption of natural resources equates to the opportunities
and outcomes associated with their use.
These conceptualizations of equity are important both for
moral reasons and the need to share benefits and costs as
a means of encouraging conservation (Krattiger & Lesser
1995). This suggests that land placed under voluntary
covenants should receive the appropriate recognition in kind
to cover costs incurred in the arrangements, and in some
cases opportunity costs foregone by the private landholder
in conserving nature for the benefit of the community.
However, the answer as to what is equitable is subjective,
being linked to individual perceptions and values. A secure
basis for determining equitability can therefore be difficult to
achieve, requiring an understanding of all factors that different
stakeholders use to determine equity on an individual basis,
and then arriving at a consensus over what might be acceptable
to most. One of the challenges in the use of management
agreements is how to achieve a cost-effective incentive
mechanism for motivating private landholders to participate
in nature conservation where perceptions of (in)equity vary
between individuals.
Compensation and resource substitution programmes
(Spergel 1997) are a way of achieving equity, particularly
where the service provided by the landholder can be classified
as a community conservation service. There is, however,
difficulty in establishing the point at which the landholder’s
duty of care ends and the community conservation service
begins (Binning & Young 1997). This creates a challenge in
determining fairness in compensation that addresses costs
or losses incurred beyond the duty of care. Furthermore,
because conservation values and expected actions under duty
of care vary from one landholding to another, it is difficult to
determine the different levels of recompense to award each
landholder.
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In addition, it is necessary to know the socioeconomic
profile of the participants and their dependence on the
resources that are placed under conservation (Jodha &
Russell 1997). Equity should ensure there are plans to
minimize the disruption of people’s lives resulting from
participation and loss of access to the resources. Equity
promoting compensatory measures (Jodha & Russell 1997),
often influenced by existing institutional arrangements and
decision-making processes associated with the conservation
initiative, should be employed.
In a comparison of aspects of voluntary and regulatory
approaches to natural resource conservation, Brant (2000)
asserted that many landholders wanted to adopt conservation
practices/systems but were hampered by high social and/or
economic costs, stressing the importance of adequate
monetary compensation to ensure that social benefits
outweighed social costs and that they coincided with
landholders’ short- and long-term plans. Safeguards to
enhance equity in conservation programmes may involve a
mix of measures dealing with compensation for sacrifices,
providing a share in the gains in the short- and long-term, and
incorporating the views of the affected people in the choice
and design of conservation measures (Jodha & Russell 1997).
In the USA, the federal government has provided cost share
payment to farmers who implemented conservation practices
on their property, a payment in principle of society’s share
of the cost of conservation for the benefit that it gains (Brant
2000).
Legislative and regulatory frameworks can be used
effectively to prevent inequity by assigning costs and benefits
of conservation. For example, frameworks might ensure that
benefits are distributed in proportion to the costs incurred in
managing the conservation site, and the purchase of labour
and capital inputs (Borrini-Feyerabend 1997).

Property rights
Conservation covenants challenge traditional landholders’
concepts of rights in relation to land ownership. Granting
of a conservation covenant essentially creates a legal partition
of the ownership bundle of property rights (Gustanski 2000).
Rights typically removed from the land by a conservation
easement (or restrictive covenant) include development and
mining, and those rights that remain are non-destructive
(Gustanski 2000) of environmental values jointly agreed to
by the covenantor and covenantee. There is no universal
definition of property rights (Meyer 2000). It constantly
changes with time and in accordance to societal expectations
and the context in which they are applied. However, property
rights assign the authority for any non-prohibited use of
specific goods (Eggertsson 1990) and the rights to claim that
use or the benefits that flow from the goods (Macpherson
1978). A right bestows on an individual the ability to compel
the State to defend their interest in a particular outcome
(Sjaastad & Bromley 2000).
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Property rights, therefore, ‘establish relationships among
participants in any social and economic system and express the
relative power of the rights bearer’ for a specific period (Meyer
2000, p. 1). The concept of property rights is broad, extending
beyond the legal sphere to include social norms (Eggertsson
1990) that are ‘supported by the force of etiquette, social
custom, ostracism and formal legally enacted laws supported
by the States’ power of violence or punishment’ (Alchian
1977, pp.129–130). As society changes over time, notions of
property can become controversial in terms of what it is and
what it ought to be: ‘The perception and reality of it make
property both a concept and an institution, both of which
influence each other over time’ (Macpherson 1978, p. 1).
Despite the notion among many people that the land
under their title can be used, enjoyed and treated as
they wish, historical actions by governments and courts
suggest that property rights of private landowners are shared
with the public (Meyer 2000). All external interest in
nature conservation on privately-owned land falls under
the institution of ‘common property’ rather than ‘private
property’ and users of ‘common property’ share rights to the
resources and are subject to rules and restrictions that govern
the use of those resources (Cullet 2001). Any dealing with a
private landholding under common property therefore has to
take into account the entitlements of others and is subject to
approval by all those with a stake in it.
Property rights are therefore a bundle of rights, such as the
right to sell, lease, donate, subdivide and grant a covenant,
just as the public also has a bundle of rights, such as to tax,
take for public use and regulate use (Farrier 1995). These
rights can be added or subtracted, thus changing the amount
of benefits streaming from the rights. Recent trends have
led to the addition of air and water quality protection, and
species conservation and preservation, to public rights. What
are perceived to be the accorded rights with respect to land
use may differ from one landholder to another and from one
period to another. In many democracies, the bundle of rights
to a suite of benefits from a given set of resources is controlled
through private ownership, public open access, public closed
access and state ownership (Meyer 2000).
Klapproth and Johnson (2001) note that landholders’ fear
of possible future introduction of regulations by government
to restrict their use of buffer zones is a deterrent to the
decision to enter into an agreement for their reservation.
Attenuation of property rights by the State and avoidance of
responsibility for maintenance of the conservation zone were
other reasons mentioned by landholders as factors deterring
their entry into an agreement to reserve the buffer zones.
The existence of concern about an increased burden of
government regulations on property owners and the loss of
control over the management of the property under a formal
conservation arrangement for the public good, has been raised
(i.e. United States Department of Agriculture 1999; Bates
2001). Formal recognition of these concerns, and taking steps
to ameliorate them, involve duty of care and stewardship,
incentives and compensation. Property rights have relevance

in social relationships beyond the more apparent relationship
between people and property (Vira 1995). Their definition
and allocation therefore require that they be considered in the
broad social context in which they are to be applied (Cullet
2001).
Conservation ethic and stewardship
Many issues and decisions on nature conservation on
private land cannot be addressed solely through technical
expertise or science because they are linked to important
values and ethics. In turn, these are linked to the social
environment, to the economic environment, to perceptions
and to knowledge of nature conservation (Bengston 1994).
These linkages must be taken into account in setting up nature
conservation mechanisms. Environmental ethics are generally
broad and more abstract than values, as they apply to humanenvironment relationships. They deal more specifically with
human conduct towards, or interaction with, the biophysical
environment, the drivers and structure of this interaction and
what constitutes the appropriate relationship (Manning et al.
1999).
Equity, duty of care and stewardship of natural resources
and property are linked (Binning & Young 1997). Stewardship
is the partnership between landholders and other bodies,
formed to carry out set conservation objectives, where benefits
of conservation extend beyond the landholder to the public.
This involves actions by the landholder that include, but go
beyond, the duty of care, the expected reasonable response
by a landholder to prevent harm emanating from actions
or inactions on the property and extending to others. The
principle of prevention of harm implicitly refers to present
and future generations, linking duty of care to the concept
of intergenerational equity. Duty of care legislation could
set standards that require individuals to act within their
‘reasonable and practical’ ability to prevent harm to the
environment where risk occurs (Bates 2001). Stewardship
extends this ‘command and control’ and compensation should
be paid to landholders only for activities over and above
the duty of care (Binning & Young 1997). Landholders
may recognize a problem that requires conservation actions,
but feel it is beyond their scope of effort to undertake it
within a stewardship partnership. In such circumstances,
Klapproth and Johnson (2001) pointed out that varying the
level of technical assistance may be necessary according to
individual needs. Assistance is also particularly important in
the introduction of a conservation programme and when the
expected conservation practices are complex and landholders
are unfamiliar with them.
Linking duty of care with the concepts of intergenerational
equity and sustainable development, where landholders can
relate to them, may stimulate their interest to carry out actions
that accept, but then go beyond, the duty of care. This notion
is based on the premise that humans behave rationally to
safeguard what they view to be in their interest, or even
perhaps in the interest of the next generation.
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DEVELOPING HYPOTHESES AND A MODEL
Drawing on the factors that influence landholders to adopt
environmental innovations, technologies or conservation
practices, this review has identified a multiplicity of factors
that might influence landholders’ decisions to place a perpetual
covenant on their lands. Landholders may be more likely to
be positively motivated towards the uptake of a perpetual
covenant if they:
• farm part-time and/or farm as a way of life;
• are less economically dependent on their property;
• are younger and do not have a long period of land
ownership in the family;
• are older, have a long period of land ownership in the
family, and perceive that property values will not be
cherished by subsequent generations;
• have a strong nature conservation ethic, demonstrated by,
among other things, strong value and attachment to the
natural environment;
• have a higher level of knowledge and awareness about
covenanting as an option; and
• perceive that a covenant can legitimately avert long-term
degradation and thereby minimize risks to their property
or family from an environmental threat.
Similarly, greater effort may be needed to convince
landholders to uptake a perpetual covenant on their land where
they:
• perceive the possibility of financial obligation arising from
entering a perpetual covenant on their land;
• perceive a loss in market value of their land because of
placing a perpetual covenant on it;
• have a strong notion of property rights that is not
diminished by notions of common property;
• dislike restrictions on land use (for a variety of
reasons such as disliking change, or the imposition of
restrictions from external regulatory sources, urban or
otherwise);
• perceive the need for compensation where any act or
process they might undertake is in the public good; and/or
• perceive that equity will not be achieved or not in a timely
way, by compensation or incentive packages.
Each of the above statements serves as an hypothesis about
those landholders likely to adopt conservation covenants.
Together they suggest that landholders who fit a certain profile
will be easily motivated towards the uptake of a covenant for
nature conservation. The list may serve as a valuable adjunct
to the barriers to uptake proposed by Vanclay and Lawrence
(1994). The list also demonstrates the heterogeneous nature of
landholder motivations to become involved in a conservation
initiative like a covenanting programme, and that programmes
that have a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach will be too inflexible for
a landscape of multiple landholders.
These hypotheses are supported by Parker’s (2004) parallel
work on the motivation and choices available to land
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trusts when deciding whether to conserve donated land
by owning it outright, or hold conservation easements
and on-sell land to a new landholder. Land trusts, nonprofit organizations that seek to preserve or enhance
environmental amenities, are principally motivated by a nature
conservation ethic, and beyond this economic considerations
operate. Review of land trusts operating in the USA
demonstrates that conservation easements generated higher
transaction costs than if the land trust purchased and
subsequently owned the land outright (Parker 2004). Even
so, where production and nature conservation were jointly
required on properties, the conservation easement option
was more appropriate; a divided ownership arrangement
can operate with the land trust/conservationist and a
landholder/producer. The landholder can then concentrate
on production of commodities, the land trust as purchaser
of the covenant can provide an environmental service to
its customers (land trust beneficiaries) (Parker 2004). This
situation is relevant here in that the landholder’s decision over
whether to covenant land will be negotiated with a covenantor,
an agency equipped to administer the contractual obligations
of the covenant.
We propose a conceptual model (from Kabii 2004) of
how the hypotheses suggested here might be inter-related.
The voluntary uptake of covenants by landholders may
be achieved through policy makers and decision makers
in land trusts paying attention to the pathways indicated,
mediated by these five constructs: economic dependence on
property, private property rights, confidence in perpetual
covenant mechanisms, nature conservation equity and nature
conservation ethic (Fig. 1). The criteria for awarding economic
incentives are based on ‘entitlements’ and ‘inability’ of
landholders (Fig. 1). Economic incentives are awarded to
landholders as entitlement on equity grounds to compensate
for loss of private property rights, and as the public’s
contribution to cost sharing in nature conservation for actions
beyond the duty of care. In this sense, we include in our
definition of ‘entitlement’ the market-based amount for which
the landholder is willing to settle. Economic incentives are
also awarded based on landholders’ inability to carry out
stewardship actions (Fig. 1). This is particularly the case
where there is evidence that a landholder is willing but unable
to cover the cost of conservation under a perpetual covenant.
Duty of care lies outside the model, but it is depicted in order
to illustrate its relationship with the constructs and factors
of the model. The quality of duty of care is influenced by
quality of stewardship and the attitudes to private property
rights of landholders. Confidence in permanent covenant
mechanisms leading to an uptake is mediated by the degree
to which landholders are informed (through knowledge and
awareness) about the mechanisms, the effectiveness of the
mechanism to achieve its specified goals and the compatibility
of the mechanism with the landholder’s own goals. Command
and control regulation should operate to enforce the duty of
care, while payments are made for stewardship and on equity
grounds.
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Figure 1 Conceptual model
showing the necessary factors and
policy tools in a coordinated
framework for promoting
landholders’ uptake of perpetual
covenants. The bold rectangular
boxes in the model represent the
five principal constructs in the
uptake of a perpetual covenant. The
lines with an arrowhead depict the
model processes, with the arrow
pointing to the output that results
from a given intervention. The
thin-bordered rectangles denote
other interventions and factors that
have an effect on the principal
constructs, or model outcomes,
apart from a perpetual covenant
uptake, which are affected by one or
more constructs. The areas enclosed
by the dotted lines denote the area of
influence of the policy intervention
(within the grey-shaded rectangles).
Extension policy and programmes
are suggested in the model as the
overall operative tools for
facilitating the achievement of the
uptake of perpetual covenant goals.
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The goal of the conceptual model is to encourage the
uptake of perpetual covenants by identifying likely barriers
to their uptake, and offering approaches to their removal,
while concurrently building a nature conservation ethic, sound
understanding of long-term nature conservation mechanisms
and providing management support.
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